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THIRTEENTH ANNUAL FRANK M. COFFIN LECTURE
ON LAW AND PUBLIC SERVICE
EDrroRS' NoTE
The Thirteenth Annual Frank M. Coffin Lecture on Law and Public Service
was held in the fall of 2004. Justice Richard J. Goldstone, former Justice of the
Constitutional Court of South Africa and pioneer for international justice and hu-
man rights, delivered the lecture. Established in 1992, the lecture honors Judge
Frank M. Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, an inspiration, mentor, and friend to the University of Maine
School of Law. 1
1. Past lectures from this series include: Joseph J. Rauh, Jr., Nomination and Confirmation of
Supreme Court Justices: Some Personal Observations, 45 ME. L. REv. 1 (1993) (delivered post-
humously by Mr. Rauh's widow, Olie Rauh, and their son, Michael Rauh, who were joined by
Justice William Brennan); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Multiculturalism and the Bill of Rights, 46
ME. L. REV. 189 (1994); Patricia M. Wald, Whose Public Interest is it Anyway?: Advice for
Altruistic Young Lawyers, 47 ME. L. REv. 3 (1995); Drew S. Days III, Race and the Federal
Criminal Justice System: A Look at the Issue of Selective Prosecution, 48 ME. L. REv. 179 (1996);
Alvin J. Bronstein, Representing the Powerless: Lawyers Can Make a Difference, 49 ME. L.
REV. 1 (1997); Robert R. Reich, What Happened to the American Social Compact?, 50 ME. L.
REv. 1 (1998); Warren B. Rudman, The Law of Unintended Results: The Independent Counsel
Law, 51 ME. L. Rav. 1 (1999); Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, In Pursuit of the Public Good:
Lawyers Who Care, 52 ME. L. REV. 301 (2000); Alan B. Morrison, Must the Interests of the
Client Always Come First?, 53 ME. L. REv. 471 (2001); Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt:
Equality Lessons from Religion, Disability, Sexual Orientation, and Transgender, 54 ME. L.
REV. 159 (2002); Cruz Reynoso, The Lawyer as a Public Citizen, 55 ME. L. REv. 335 (2003);
Scott Harshbarger, Strengthening Democracy: The Challenge of Public Interest Law, 56 ME. L.
REv. 214 (2004).
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THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
Honorable Richard J. Goldstone*
I. INTRODUCTION
Dean Khoury, Judge Coffin, Mrs. Coffin, your Honors, Ladies and Gentle-
men: It's a wonderful privilege and great pleasure to be with you this evening, and
to be back for the second time this year in Maine. One of the unexpected pleasures
of having been invited to deliver this lecture was telling people in New York, Wash-
ington, D.C., or Boston that I was delivering the Coffin lecture. The reaction of
people was quite remarkable. A warm glow would suddenly surround everybody
in the room, and they would say, "Oh, Judge Coffin!" and would follow with won-
derful remarks about Frank Coffin. I look forward, in the next years, to telling
people that I delivered the Coffin lecture and hope to enjoy the same warmth and
reaction. We have been with Judge and Mrs. Coffin since lunch today, and I speak
for Noleen as well: we feel we've been here longer than half a day, and one of the
great benefits of this invitation is the possibility of spending most of the weekend
with them. It has also been a delight for me to meet their family: two of their
daughters, their son, some of their grandchildren, and other members of their fam-
ily. So, thank you very much, indeed, for whoever is responsible for inviting me to
deliver the 2004 Coffin lecture.
II. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
In his very generous and well-researched introduction, Judge Coffin mentioned
that I ended my book, For Humanity,1 on a note of optimism. Let me immediately
say that I remain optimistic about the future of international justice-there is a
certain amount of caution in the optimism, but nevertheless, optimism. I am opti-
mistic because one must bear in mind that sixty years ago, there was no such thing
as international criminal justice. Nobody would have understood the concept. We
must remember that prior to the end of World War II, save for domestic prosecu-
tion of war crimes, there was no international criminal law at all.2 The only crimi-
nal law dispensed was by domestic courts, and for this reason international crimi-
nals went free. They benefited from complete immunity, especially war crimi-
nals. 3 Because, if you think about it, war criminals, almost by definition, come
* Richard Goldstone is a former Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and
former Chief Prosecutor for the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda. He is currently the Henry Shattuck Visiting Professor of Law at Harvard
Law School. Justice Goldstone would like to thank his research assistant and former law clerk,
Isabel Goodman, for her assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. RICHARD GOLDSTONE, FOR HuMANrry: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATOR (2000).
2. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 16 (2003).
3. There are various barriers to prosecuting international crimes nationally. These include
laws granting amnesty for broad categories of crimes, national statutes of limitations, the pro-
hibition on double jeopardy, and national immunity from prosecution for heads of state. For a
detailed discussion of these impediments, see id. at 312-22.
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from oppressive societies, from dictatorships; war criminals don't, as a rule, come
from democracies. More often than not, they are regarded as war heroes and not
war criminals by their own societies.4
The change began as a consequence of the Holocaust and the terrible war
crimes that were committed by the Nazi regime in World War II. The law has
always reacted-it is not pro-active and it cannot be-the law always reacts to
facts on the ground, not only in the field of criminal law, but throughout the whole
plethora of legal mechanisms, laws, and legal tools. When technology changes,
the law has to change to keep up with it, whether it is the Internet or new types of
weapons. Thus, after the First World War, the Geneva Conventions had to be
changed to include air warfare, which didn't exist before the First World War. It's
no different with respect to war crimes.
It was a consequence of the Second World War that governments, that nations,
began to realize that they had to take notice and become involved when other
governments ill-treated and violated fundamental human rights of their citizens.
This was a huge change. It is reflected in the Charter of the United Nations, which,
for the first time ever in an international legal instrument, recognizes and seeks to
protect individual human rights.5 Before the United Nations Charter, individual
human beings had no standing at all in international law. International law dealt
with governments, and there were no courts, no mechanisms at all for individuals
to seek justice outside their own domestic courts.6 And, by definition again, in
oppressive societies, individuals had no standing, even in front of their own do-
mestic courts. 7 So, the law followed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 8
which was an aspirational document; it wasn't intended to have any legally bind-
ing effect, but it gave birth in the 1960s to a whole series of international covenants
dealing with human rights, particularly the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights9 and the International Covenant dealing with Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. 10
The second effect of World War II was that people started questioning the
absolute theory of the sovereignty of nations.tI The belief grew that people and
their governments were entitled to take notice and to comment when human rights
violations were perpetrated.
My own country provides a good illustration: South Africa had practiced
racial discrimination and racial oppression for well over 300 years, since 1652,
when the Dutch first colonized the Cape of Good Hope. 12 In 1948, the National
4. Examples of this phenomenon are Slobodan Milosovic, Radovan Karadzic, and Ratko
Mladic.
5. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3, art. 13, para. (1)(b), art. 55, para. (c).
6. CASSESE, supra note 2, at 37.
7. Augusto Pinochet, for example, enjoyed immunity for almost twenty years before this was
finally brought to an end. GOLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 121.
8. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
9. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc A/6316
(1966).
10. Id.
11. M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to
Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS, J. 11, 21 (1997).
12. Frangois du Bois, The Past and Present of South African Law, 32 INrr'L J. LEGAL INFO. 217,
217 (2004).
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Party introduced the apartheid system, which legalized racist policies that had been
enforced for three centuries before. 13 This legalization of injustice was raised in
the General Assembly in 1949 by the Indian representative to the United Nations. 14
India proposed a resolution condemning the manner in which the South African
government was ill-treating people of Indian origin in South Africa. 15 The resolu-
tion was passed by the General Assembly over the negative votes, clearly of South
Africa, but also of the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. 16 Their
governments didn't want the United Nations looking into their racial policies at
that time. South Africa's response, which was widely accepted, was that: "this is
not your business; the way we treat our citizens or ill-treat our citizens is our inter-
nal affair."
Although South Africa's response was widely accepted at the time, the senti-
ment changed. Over the following decades, it was the international community
that was instrumental in bringing an end to apartheid. South Africa had pariah
status. Boycotts, economic sanctions, divestment, and disinvestment led by the
United States forced South African white minority leaders to realize that the apart-
heid system was not only a dead-end, but a bloody end at that. In 1973, the Gen-
eral Assembly passed the International Treaty, 17 which declared apartheid in South
Africa to be a crime against humanity. The treaty almost completed a circle that
began with the Nuremberg trials, which first recognized crimes against human-
ity. 19
World War II, and particularly Nuremberg, also opened a Pandora's Box with
respect to universal jurisdiction. Until then, national courts only had jurisdiction,
generally speaking, for crimes committed within their geographic areas of juris-
diction. 19 American courts, for example, could only hear criminal cases in respect
to crimes committed in the United States. 20 And that was the position literally in
every country of the world. The one exception, of course, was for piracy.2 1 Pi-
rates could be brought to trial in any court in any land. Otherwise, pirates would
get away with their deeds with complete impunity because pirates, by definition,
don't commit their crimes on land; they commit them on the high seas.22 If there
wasn't universal jurisdiction, there wouldn't be any court of jurisdiction.
But World War I so horrified decent people in many, many countries that they
decided that, for some international crimes, there should be universal jurisdic-
13. See id. at 224-25.
14. G.A. Res. 265, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 6, U.N. Doc. AIRES/265 (1949).
15. Id.
16. 1948-49 U.N.Y.B. [310], U.N. Doc. AIRES/395 (1949).
17. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,
G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Agenda Item 53, art. 1, U.N. Doc. AIRES/3068 (1973).
18. See Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Niiremberg Tribu-
nal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, Adopted by The International Law Commission of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, at 188 (1946), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950!
Add.1.
19. CASSESE, supra note 2, at 277-85.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 284.
22. See id.
tion. 23 In other words, jurisdiction would not depend on where the crime was
committed, but on the nature of the crime itself. 24 If the crimes were sufficiently
serious, people suspected of having committed those crimes could be brought to
justice in the courts of any country, no matter how far removed, how remote, or
however disconnected with the actual commission of the crime.25
Universal jurisdiction was first recognized internationally in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 26 which defined the worst of all crimes and called them grave
breaches. 27 Today there is not a country that hasn't ratified the Geneva Conven-
tions. 28 The Geneva Conventions oblige all these nations to bring to justice people
who commit grave breaches of the Conventions, no matter where or when com-
mitted. 29 The Convention goes on to provide that if a country is unwilling or
unable to prosecute such a person itself, it is obliged to turn that person over to a
government of a country that is prepared to do so. 30
The Apartheid Convention followed in 1973, creating universal jurisdiction
for the crime of apartheid. 31 It was honored in the breach. Regrettably, the West-
ern democracies ignored the Apartheid Convention. 32 South African government
officials, ambassadors, and other South Africans guilty of the crime of apartheid
could go and do their business in New York, Washington, London, Paris, or Bonn,
and not fear being arrested for having been complicit in the crime of apartheid.
Apartheid might well have ended ten years earlier had that Convention been taken
seriously by the trading partner countries of South Africa.
The 1984 Torture Convention 33 included provisions for universal jurisdic-
tion, and that did have an effect. It was under that convention that General Pinochet,
23. The reason for extending universal jurisdiction is perhaps best explained in the case of
Eichmann by the District Court of Jerusalem, judgment of 12 December 1961, English transla-
tion in 36 I.L.R. 5-276: "Not only do all the crimes attributed to the appellant bear an interna-
tional character, but their harmful and murderous effects were so embracing and widespread as
to shake the international community to its very foundations." Id.
24. CASSESE, supra note 2, at 284-85.
25. See id.
26. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1950); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, adopted on Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered
into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, adopted on Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
27. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 147, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
28. For a list of parties to the Geneva Conventions and its Protocols, see International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, States Party to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols
(Jan. 6, 2004), at http://www.icrc.org/eng/party-gc.
29. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra
note 27, art. 146.
30. Id.
3t. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime ofApartheid,
supra note 17, art. 4.
32. There have been no documented cases of prosecution on the basis of the Apartheid Con-
vention.
33. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doe. A/39/51
(1984).
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the former dictator of Chile, was arrested in a London clinic in 1998, at the request
of a Spanish judge, for crimes allegedly committed in Chile almost twenty years
before. 34 That development surprised international lawyers and the international
community. The Spanish court accepted universal jurisdiction; the House of Lords
in London agreed that this instance was a recognized basis for exercising universal
jurisdiction and ordered the extradition of General Pinochet. 35 In the following
year, the British government, on the grounds of the ill health of General Pinochet,
decided not to fulfill the order.36 But that arrest in the London clinic, and the
recognition of its legality by the highest courts of England and Wales had impor-
tant consequences, in Chile in particular. There were many victims in Chile who
were suddenly given a voice by the English decision. The decision also had an-
other effect: it stopped some other former dictators from traveling. Not long after
the Pinochet decision, the Frankfurt Algemeine37 reported that the former dictator
of Indonesia, President Soeharto, had cancelled an appointment in a German clinic
where he was used to going for treatment. The former dictator of Ethiopia, who
was in Zimbabwe, came to Johannesburg for medical treatment.38 Human Rights
Watch in New York raised a hue and cry, and Mengistu Haile Mariam beat a hasty
retreat back to Zimbabwe.39 It's remarkable that the dictators, the oppressive leaders
who don't think twice about violating the rights of their people, seek for them-
selves the best medical treatment the world can offer. They also seek holidays at
the most expensive pleasant holiday resorts. Some were being denied that.
Universal jurisdiction had begun to bite. It may be bad news for travel agents
of human rights violators, but it's good news for us. The twelve international
conventions dealing with terrorism (beginning in the 1970s, not after September
11th of 2001), airplane hijacking, diplomats being taken hostage, and ships on the
high seas all provide for universal jurisdiction. 40 Courts around the world are
34. R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet, 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 2000).
35. Id.
36. Pinochet Set Free, BBC NEws, Mar. 2,2000, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/663170.stm
(last visited Feb. 10, 2005). Pinochet was released on March 2, 2000. Id.
37. ALGEmEwN, at http://www.faz.net (with paid subscription).
38. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, South Africa Urged to Bring Ethiopian Dictator to
Justice (Nov. 24, 1999), at http:llwww.hrw.orglpressl1999/nov/ethI124.htm.
39. Id.
40. The twelve conventions are as follows: Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641,860 U.N.T.S.
105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971,24 U.S.T. 565,974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, opened for
signatureonDec. 14, 1973,28 U.S.T. 1975,1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1315 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668; Inter-
national Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 249;
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 39
I.L.M. 270; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, 18 I.L.M.
1419; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving Interna-
tional Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474; Convention on the Marking of Plastic
Explosives for the Purpose of Identification, Mar. 1, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 721; Protocol for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental
Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304.
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being armed by their governments with the power to exercise universal jurisdic-
tion over the most serious crimes from which the international community suffers.
The 1948 Genocide Convention,4 1 interestingly, didn't recognize or confer
universal jurisdiction. It provided that jurisdiction for this most horrible of all crimes,
genocide, would be conferred either on domestic courts where the crime was com-
mitted or in an international court having jurisdiction. 42 It was assumed that there
would be an international criminal court having jurisdiction with respect to war
crimes committed anywhere. 43 The establishment of such a court was prevented
by the Cold War. The Soviet Union and China had no wish for such a court. So, it
was put on the back burner.44 Draft rules and procedures for an international
criminal court gathered much dust in back rooms at the United Nations' offices in
New York. It was only in 1993, again to the surprise of the most seasoned interna-
tional lawyers, that the United Nations Security Council set up the first ever Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,45 and that was followed in
the following year by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.4,
As a footnote, it is interesting that the United States is unique in allowing what
is in effect universal jurisdiction for civil claims arising from serious violations of
human rights of foreigners. The Alien Tort Claims Act of 178947 provides juris-
diction in the federal courts where foreigners can sue foreigners for serious human
rights violations recognized by the United States. These are unusual provisions,
and some people refer to them as an example of the United States' arrogance in
allowing its federal courts to exercise that sort of jurisdiction. It's not. It was an
unusual development in the 18th century to deal with ambassadors' rights being
violated; it was intended to deal with piracy, and so forth. 48 I applaud its use in our
time to condemn serious human rights violations, wherever they may occur.
A few words about the United States' approach to international law and to
international justice. There has always been an ambivalence. I'm over-simplify-
ing and hope I'm not being unfair when I suggest that the attitude over more than
a century has been: International law is a good idea for the rest of the world but not
for us. And we encourage the rest of the world to use it, to get on with it, but don't
use it against our citizens. We want our citizens to be subject only to our courts
and not to international courts.
There is a fear that international courts and international organizations will
have an anti-American bias that would make it unfair and inappropriate to subject
United States' citizens to their jurisdiction.
41. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277.
42. Id. art. 6.
43. This is evidenced by Article V1 of the Genocide Convention, which refers to an "interna-
tional penal tribunal" with jurisdiction over the crime of genocide. Id.
44. Hakan Friman, The International Criminal Court: Negotiations and Key Issues, 8 AFR.
SEC. REv. No. 6 (1999), available at http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/8No6fInterCourt.html.
45. Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
46. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
47. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).
48. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2759 (2004).
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The United States was, above all countries, responsible for the establishment
of the Yugoslavia tribunal by the Security Council.4 9 It was the Clinton adminis-
tration, but in particular the commitment of its ambassador, Madeleine Albright,
that convinced the United Nations Security Council to set up an international crimi-
nal tribunal. 50 As its first prosecutor, I had the difficult task of setting up an inter-
national prosecutor's office. From my own personal experience I can assure you
that, without the United States' approval or political and financial resources, that
tribunal would never have got off its feet; it would never have got to work. It was
also the United States that pushed for the Rwanda tribunal to be set up. And again,
it was the United States that made it a reality.
The American Bar Association played a crucial role in assuring fair trials in
the Yugoslavia tribunal. As I mentioned in my book,51 it was the then-director of
the American Bar Association, Mark Ellis (the founding director) who came to the
Hague soon after I arrived. He said: "The American Bar would like to help you,
the prosecutor of the Yugoslavia tribunal; how can it do so?" I told him that the
best way the American Bar could assist was to ensure that defendants who came
before this tribunal would have adequate defense counsel. That appealed immedi-
ately to Mark Ellis, and to the American Bar Association. So, in the first trial of
Dusko Tadic, 52 the American Bar employed two British barristers, experienced
criminal barristers, to join the Dutch leader of the defense team. 53 The reason was
that the judges had decided that the tribunal should have more or less an adversarial
system of trial, the kind you and I are used to, where counsel fight each other in
front of a neutral judge who is a referee, and not an active participant, as judges are
in a civil system.
Tadic received a list of counsel who offered their services to the registrar of
the court. They were not pro bono counsel but were paid by the United Nations.
Tadic's eyes fell on the name Vladimeroff. Tadic is a Serb, and he knew that
Russians had an affinity for Serbians and that Vladimeroff was a Russian. And he
said, "I'll have him." Vladimeroff didn't speak a word of Russian; his grandfather
had immigrated to Holland as a youngster. Fortunately, however, he was a leading
criminal lawyer at the Hague, but he had never cross-examined, he had never
watched a cross-examination, and he found himself in a position where he would
be required to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. He was not equipped to
do so. The American Bar employed the two English barristers for two weeks to
come and teach Vladimeroff how to cross-examine. It didn't take too many hours
for the three of them to realize one can't learn to cross-examine in two weeks. The
American Bar then decided to employ the two barristers to join Vladimeroff's
team. At that point, the U.N. only had financing for one counsel, not three. Soon
after that, I'm happy to say, the registrar of the Court agreed that the United Na-
tions would pay for all three of them. This was crucial. If the Yugoslavia tribunal
had relied on unfit trial counsel, it would have been the death knell of international
tribunals, of international courts.
49. Barbara Crossette, Time is Short for U.S. to Join the International Criminal Court, N.Y.
TiM s, Nov. 24, 2000, at A9.
50. Id.
51. GOLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 119.
52. Prosecutor v. TAdic, Case No. IT-94-1-T Int. Crim. Tnb. for the Former Yugoslavia (7
May 1997) available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/ICTY/1997/l.html.
53. They were William Clegg Q.C. and John Livingston.
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When our office was opened, twenty-three leading United States lawyers, pros-
ecutors, investigators, and computer technicians were sent from Washington at no
cost to the United Nations; that was a gift from the United States government.
They played a very important role, a crucial role, in assuring the efficiency and
fairness of the procedures in the Yugoslavia tribunal.
The United Nations tribunals were successful in two important respects. First,
they advanced the use of the Geneva Conventions, which had seldom been used.
They were excellent laws on paper, but laws that are not implemented are not
worth much more than the paper that they're written on. Now, for the first time,
the law was not only being used, it was advanced. Just as one example, the recog-
nition of systematic mass rape and other gender crimes as war crimes was new.
54
The Rwanda Tribunal held that systematic rape could constitute genocide. 55 There
were huge advances in that area and in other areas. A further success was the
demonstration that fair trials could be held in an international tribunal-that wasn't
a given, it wasn't accepted. I haven't read or heard any serious criticism of the
fairness of the trials before the international tribunals sitting in the Hague or Arusha.
Those successes led to the push for a permanent international criminal court,
and again, it was Madeleine Albright who encouraged Kofi Annan, the then newly
appointed Secretary General of the United Nations, to call a diplomatic conference
in Rome in the middle of 1998.56 One hundred and sixty nations turned up, and
120 voted in favor of the Rome Treaty to set up the International Criminal Court.5 7
Regrettably, at that point, the United States' policy took almost a 180-degree turn.
It was the Pentagon-the military-who feared American citizens appearing be-
fore any international criminal court. 58 They were suspicious of runaway pros-
ecutors, dishonest judges, and bias against the United States. So, the Clinton ad-
ministration tried to curtail the power of this new international criminal court. The
Clinton administration wished only the Security Council to have authority to trig-
ger an investigation by the International Criminal Court. 59 That way they could,
by the use of its veto, stop any investigations that it didn't like or that could have
been embarrassing either to Washington or to a friendly state. It was rejected, and
rightly so.60 To have an international criminal court dependent on a political
gatekeeper, which the Security Council is, would rob the court of effectiveness
and credibility. There may as well be no international court of law at all. The
United States then suggested the system that is called "complementarity," allow-
ing the international criminal court jurisdiction only if the court of the nationality
54. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T Int. Crim. Trib. for Rwanda (2 Sept. 1998),
available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgementakayOOl.htm.
55. Id. § 7.7.
56. Alessandra Stanley, Annan Urges Formation of War Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
1998, at A6.
57. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 9th Sess., U.N. Doc. AICONF. 183
(1998), available at http:Iiwww.un.orgllawlicclstatutelromefra.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
58. Interview by BBC Radio with Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of State, (Sept. 9,
2003), available at http://www.bbc.co.uklradio4/news/unltranscripts/madeleine-albright2.shtml.
59. David J. Scheffer, Developments at the Rome Treaty Conference, Statement Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (July 23, 1998), in 9 U.S. DEP'T OF ST. DISPATCH, Aug.
1998, at 19.
60. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 57, art. 15 (authorizing
cases being initiated by the Prosecutor subject to oversight by the Pretrial Chamber).
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of the alleged war criminal is unable or unwilling itself to investigate the alleged
crime. 6 1 Under this system, the international criminal court would have no juris-
diction if, for example, an American were accused of a war crime and the United
States itself wished to investigate the alleged crime. The nations assembled in
Rome found that reasonable and this is the system that was accepted. 62 The posi-
tion under the Rome Statute is that the court has no jurisdiction where the national
authorities decide to hold a good faith investigation. 63 In order to attract jurisdic-
tion, a prosecutor would have to prove to a three-judge pretrial panel, subject to
appeal to a five-judge panel, that the domestic investigation was in fact a charade
or a fraud designed to rob the international court of jurisdiction. 64 I would suggest
this is almost an impossible burden to meet in relation to any country having a
democratic form of government and open courts. I can't believe that a prosecutor
would be able to establish that a serious investigation, whether in the United King-
dom, the United States, or any other democracy, was intended to be a sham inves-
tigation. The treaty still didn't satisfy the Pentagon. The Clinton administration
joined only six other nations, including Syria, Qatar, and China, in opposing the
Rome Treaty.65 President Clinton, of course, at the end of his term of office,
signed the treaty, not happily, but he signed it. 66 He refused to send it to the
Senate, but the United States, by his signature, indicated it would co-operate with
the International Criminal Court, and certainly would not do anything to under-
mine it.
For the court's life to begin, sixty countries had to ratify the Rome conven-
tion.6 7 The fact that 120 countries signed wasn't sufficient. Many thought that
getting the requisite numbers of ratifications would take a decade or more. It took
less than four years. By April 2002, the sixtieth country had ratified. 6 8 To date,
ninety-eight countries have ratified the treaty.69 I am optimistic for it; I believe
there is a critical mass of nations around the world behind the ICC. Almost half of
the members of the United Nations have now ratified, and that includes every
member of the European Union.70 There is hardly a traditional ally of the United
States that has not ratified the statute of the international criminal court.
Unfortunately, the current Bush administration has taken an active role to un-
dermine the court, pressuring governments to enter into ridiculous agreements at-
61. See John Seguin, Note, Denouncing the International Criminal Court: An Examination
of U.S. Objections to the Rome Statute, 18 B.U. IrT'L L.J. 85, 92-93 (2000).
62. The principle of complementarity is included as Article 17 of the Rome Statute. Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 57, art. 17.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Seguin, supra note 61, at 88.
66. Clinton's Words: 'The Right Action', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at A6.
67. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 57, art. 126.
68. On April 11, 2002, ten countries deposited their ratifications of the Rome Statute simul-
taneously. The Statute therefore entered into force on July 1, 2002. See id.
69. See Ratification Status, at http:ltwww.un.orgflawlicclstatute/romefra.htm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2005).
70. See Coalition for the ICC, Europe and CIS, at http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/
europecis.html (last visited Feb. to, 2005).
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tempting to preclude the handing over of American citizens to the International
Criminal Court, through Bilateral Immunity Agreements allegedly entered into
under Article Ninety-Eight of the Rome Statute.7 1 These are the agreements that
have been demanded, and to date, some sixty countries have entered into those
agreements.72
Nonetheless, I remain optimistic because of the critical mass of nations that
have joined the court. Let me give you just one example of how that court, I
believe, should be used today. We have all read about the terrible crimes being
committed in the Sudan, in Darfur, crimes committed against non-Arab citizens of
the Sudan. Millions of people have been forced from their homes and hundreds of
thousands forced into situations of starvation and death.73 Former Secretary of
State Colin Powell, appropriately in my view, has expressed the view of the United
States that this is genocide. 74 Being genocide, there is an obligation on the United
States to stop that criminal conduct. There have been weak resolutions in the
Security Council through no fault of the United States; China has weakened those
resolutions under threat of veto.75 This situation, I would have thought, cried out
for the Security Council to instruct the International Criminal Court, which it can
do under the Rome Treaty, to immediately investigate war crimes in the Sudan.
The Security Council could put together sufficient military forces-it can get them
from Africa, if it so wishes-and they should be authorized to apprehend those
suspected and hand them to the International Criminal Court. It would be an ex-
emplary use of the powers of the International Criminal Court and it would send a
message. It would send a message that the international community is no longer
prepared to allow a situation like that in Rwanda to happen again. President Clinton
apologized on behalf of the United States for not doing more to stop the Rwanda
genocide. 76 The Security Council could do something right now at very little cost;
it wouldn't even be contrary to the approach of the United States, that the Security
Council shall hold the key to trigger the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court.
I turn now to the effects of 9/11: Terrorism, I would suggest, harms democ-
racy by making its citizens believe that their liberties are a source of weakness.
The opposite is the truth. Your liberties, and I am happy to say as a South African,
71. See, e.g., Treaty Affairs Staff, A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of
the United States in Force on January 1, 2004, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/38401.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
72. See id.; Countries with Bilateral Immunity Agreements, Sept. 29, 2003, at http://
www.endgenocide.org/ceg-icc/article98/tableofbias.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
73. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Sec-
retary-General, at 3 (Jan. 25, 2005), at http:/lwww.un.org/News/dhlsudanlcom-inq-darfur.pdf.
74. Colin Powell, Speech to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Sept. 9, 2004); see
Powell calls Sudan Killings Genocide, Sept. 9, 2004, at http:/www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/
africa/09/09/sudan.powell.
75. See generally S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/2004!703 (2004);
S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. SJRES/1564 (2004); S.C. Res. 1574, U.N.
SCOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2004/947 (2004); see also Human Rights Watch, The United
Nations and Darfur (Jan. 2005), at http://hrw.org/wr2k5/darfur/3.htm.
76. On March 25, 1998, President Clinton acknowledged that "[w]e did not act quickly enough
." to stop the genocide. A News Hour with Jim Lehrer Transcript: Promoting Peace (Mar. 25,
1998), at http://www.pbs.org/newshourlbb/africa/jan-june98/rwanda-3-25a.html.
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my liberties, are a source of strength, not a source of weakness. Disproportionate
responses to terrorism harm democracy and imperil liberty. The challenge facing
democracy is to find a proportionate response to terrorism. The two leading de-
mocracies, the United States and the United Kingdom, I would suggest, have over-
reacted. They have endangered civil liberties in very material respects. In the
United Kingdom, the legality of detention without trial is being tested this week in
the House of Lords; a decision is expected within the next six weeks, according to
this morning's New York Times.77 In the United States, secret deportation hear-
ings, detention of American citizens without trial, and denial of access to lawyers
or family members are all now permissible measures. 78 One reads, for example,
in a report from the Human Rights Watch (HRW)-and let me say, as a Board
member of HRW, their reports have been exhaustively investigated-that people
have been detained and "disappeared" by the United States government.7 9 This
horrible concept of disappearances has been roundly condemned by the United
States over many years. The HRW report goes through the definitions of disap-
pearances, and they accurately say that disappearances involve four elements: (1)
deprivation of liberty against the will of the detainee; (2) direct or indirect involve-
ment of government officials; (3) refusal to acknowledge the detention or to dis-
close the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned; and (4) the removal of the
detainee from the protection of the law.80 It details, exhaustively, eleven cases
where the facts are known of people who have been disappeared by the United
States government.
On a more optimistic note, I've had the privilege in the last few months of
giving talks at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., and, more
recently, at the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs. I have been
impressed by the openness with which these issues are discussed. I was impressed
with the strong views openly expressed by students at those military colleges in
favor of the International Criminal Court and the shame they feel as military people
at this sort of thing happening.
In the majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court-and again a rea-
son for optimism-the United States Supreme Court has said, contrary to the view
of the current administration, that the federal courts do have jurisdiction over people
being detained in Guantinamo Bay.8 1 The United States Supreme Court has said
that United States citizens cannot be kept in detention without a trial, without ac-
cess to lawyers, without access to family.82 Justice O'Connor has stated clearly
that indefinite detention for the purposes of interrogation is not authorized.83 From
77. See Douglas, Jehl, The Reach of War, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2004, at Al. This decision has
now been handed down in A (FC) and others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment 2 W.L.R. 87 (H.L. 2004), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pald200405/
ldjudgmt/jdO4l2l6/a&oth- 1.htm.
78. See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act) Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001).
79. Human Rights Watch, The Road toAbu Ghraib (June 2004) at 17, at http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2004/usaO604/.
80. Id. at 12 n.26.
81. Rasul v. Bush, __ U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004).
82. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, _ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2652 (2004).
83. Id. at 2641.
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this opinion, it appears that the United States will consider both the abduction and
prolonged detention of United States' citizens without charges or trial to constitute
a violation of fundamental due process, an internationally recognized human right.84
The hope is that judges will continue to act as a check on this sort of unjustified
and unlawful overreaction.
India's Prevention of Terrorism Act, 85 draconian as it is, was completely re-
pealed by the Indian Parliament in the aftermath of a recent election that put a new
government in power. In my own country, the South African cabinet initially ap-
proved new legislation allowing for detention without trial.86 Unbelievable! A
government consisting of people who suffered from detention without trial, now in
government, is prepared to use this sort of method. The African National Con-
gress (ANC), however, controls the parliamentary committee onjustice. Based on
prior experience with this detention method in South Africa, the ANC said that it
was not prepared for people to be detained without trial. This is the strength of
democracies. Individual members of civil society and non-governmental organi-
zations are able to speak out, and if there is sufficient public pressure, political
leaders are oftentimes prepared to amend their policies rather than risk increasing
public hostility.
There is a good illustration in your own society. In November 2001, the De-
partment of Defense established new Military Commissions to try some of those
persons detained at Guantd.namo Bay. 87 The rules provided for secret trials, death
sentences by majority vote, no appeal to a higher court or authority and no right
to counsel other than appointed by the Military.88 There were protests from the
American Bar Association, from some state and city bars, and from human rights
organizations. 89 The media also weighed in. In March 2002, the rules were sig-
nificantly changed and the more deplorable provisions were removed. 90
Similar pressure can apply at the global level. Security Council Resolution
1373 peremptorily required all Member States of the United Nations to promul-
gate new legislation to combat terrorism and to respond to the Counter-Terrorism
Committee (CTC) within ninety days.9 1 Within the specified time there were 174
responses. 92 Many came from oppressive governments who needed no urging to
84. See id. at 2650-51.
85. The Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 15 of 2002, at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/coun-
tries/india/document/actandordinances/POTA.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
86. Republic of South Africa Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2002, Ch.2, part 1, §§ 27-29, at http://
www.opbw.org/nat imp/leg-reg/south%20africa/anti-terror.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
87. The Military Commissions were established under military order of the President on
November 13, 2001. See President Issues Military Order, (Nov. 13, 2001), at http:I/
www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/policy/dod/01 1113-bush-military-order.htm.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., American Bar Association Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants,
Preliminary Report, at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/enemy-combatants.pdf (Aug. 8,2002).
90. The new rules were announced by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on March 21,
2002. The appointment, procedures, and charge sheets before these military tribunals have been
made available by the Department of Defense. See United States Department of Defense, Mili-
tary Commissions, at http://www.defenselink.millnews/commissions.html (last updates Feb. 17,
2005).
91. S.C. Res. 1373, art. 6, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. SC/7158 (2001).
92. The Counter-Terrorism Committee lists the lodging of reports on its official website. See
Counter-Terrorism Committee, Reports From Member States, at http://www.un.orgIDocs/scl
committees/I 373/submitted_reports.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).
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pass draconian legislation, further violating the fundamental civil liberties of their
citizens. 93 Many came from democratic legislatures. The initial vetting of the
legislation by the CTC did not relate at all to violations of human rights or civil
liberties. There were complaints registered, in particular, by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sergio Vieira de Mello. 94 Within a short
period the policy was changed.
This is a very open society. It has struck me many times when visiting the
United States that when I, as a foreign visitor, criticize the policies of your govern-
ment, it is not resented. The same would not necessarily be true of other democra-
cies. I have not experienced the same acceptance of criticism in other democracies
I have visited. Yet, in times of fear, there is an unfortunate tendency in all democ-
racies to defer to the executive and to tolerate serious, and sometimes unnecessary
and unjustified, inroads into civil liberties.95 It is precisely in times of threat that
civil liberties require greater protection. 96 And that protection must be demanded
from members of civil society.
When powerful democracies make these inroads into the rights of their citi-
zens, there is a most unfortunate knock-on effect in other, less democratic nations.
One reads of President Mugabe of Zimbabwe deporting Western journalists be-
cause they are "terrorist sympathizers." 97 One reads of Indonesia planning to set
up prisons similar to that at Guantdnamo Bay.98 And, of course, the despicable
conduct at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq will be cited for years to come in rebuttal to
criticism by the United States of torture in other lands.
Powerful nations should lead by example and accept being bound by an inter-
national rule of law. That was the hope of the drafters of the Charter of the United
Nations-that such a rule of law would bind the rich and powerful as well as the
poor and weak nations.99 The movement has been in that direction for the past
sixty years, and it is nothing short of tragic that the United States no longer leads
that movement and, in some respects, hinders it.
III. CONCLUSION
What of the future? I am cautiously optimistic. The birth and growth of inter-
national criminal justice has been impressive and has wide global acceptance. An
impetus has developed, and there is good reason to believe that overreaction to 9/
11 will be seen by future generations to have been a detour and not a new road.
The reason for caution lies in the present domestic and foreign policy of the
United States-the only superpower, and traditionally regarded as the leader of the
93. For example, Pakistan, Egypt and Kenya. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
Assessing the New Normal: Liberty and Security for the Post September 11 United States, 75-
76, at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/Assessing/AssessingtheNewNormal.pdf
(Sept. 2003).
94. Report of the Seminar on the Commission on Human Rights 21, World Federation of
United Nations Associations, at http://www.wfuna.org/docUploads/Final%20Report%
202004%20Seminar%20%2Epdf (July 19-23, 2004).
95. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EvI.: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR, (2004).
96. Id.
97. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, supra note 93, at 77.
98. Id. at 80.
99. The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations speaks of binding "nations large and
small." U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
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free world. The reason for optimism is the openness of your society and its com-
mitment, for more than two centuries, to democracy, not only for your own people,
but also for all people around the world. I would urge that we, who are fortunate to
live in democracies, should, at all costs, guard against becoming the appeasers of
power at the unnecessary expense of freedom.
